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Corporate Shaming Revisited:
An Essay For Bill Klein
David A. Skeel, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
I was thrilled, to say the least, when Mitu Gulati invited me to participate in
the "Criteria for Good Laws of Business Associations" symposium he and
Mark Ramseyer were organizing to honor Professor William Klein. After
directing countless students to Business Organization and Finance, Klein's
classic pocket guide to the economics of the corporation, and greatly admiring
his other work, I had never met Bill in person!1 Bill was, and is, almost larger
than life, one of the abiding figures of our discipline. The symposium would be
a chance to meet Bill, and to debate corporate law scholarship with a
remarkable group of corporate law scholars, each of whom has been touched by
Bill's work, friendship, or example.
Rather than a round of celebratory toasts, the organizers proposed a
working symposium that would shift the focus from Bill himself to his ideas
and concerns. (This shift from the person to a debate of ideas is by all accounts
deeply characteristic of Klein the colleague and scholar.) Each of the
participants was asked to explore a question that Bill Klein has worried over for
years: why do corporate law scholars rarely seem to "identify goals and
objectives," to "weigh proposals against explicitly stated criteria and to engage
in effective cost/benefit analysis?" To get the ball rolling, Klein offered a
detailed but tentative four-part schema---consisting of fairness, economic goals,
control of political and economic power, and administrative considerations-to
serve as a starting point.
There was one last marching order, as I understood it. Each participant was
invited to pick an article of our own and to look at it anew through the lens of
the Kleinian typology. We were instructed, in a sense, to take the criteria for a
test drive in our own work. Along the way, we could consider how Bill's
challenge to more carefully articulate our assumptions and his tentative list of
criteria might cause us to see the earlier work in a new light.
1. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN COFFEE, JR., BusINEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE (9th ed. 2004).
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After rooting through my own articles, I decided to revisit an article of
mine on a governance strategy I refer to as "corporate shaming."2 The
corporate shaming article stood out for several reasons. First, guided by the
poet William Carlos Williams's remark that "sometimes one's early work gives
one the creeps," I tried to pick an article that I can still bear to reread. The
shaming article seemed, at least as I remembered it, to meet this standard.
Second and more to the point, the shaming article had forced me to ponder a
variety of concerns that do not often figure prominently in my own work. Like
much corporate scholarship, my articles tend to have a consequentialist
orientation, focusing on incentives and how corporate law does and does not
influence the behaviors of managers, directors, and shareholders. Shaming
raises these issues, but it also raises questions of legitimacy and power, and
thus seems an ideal context for exploring the Kleinian typology. So that is what
I propose to do.
In the remarks that follow, I briefly revisit the issue of corporate shaming
by considering four very different contexts in which it arises. I then conclude
by offering some more general thoughts about the Kleinian typology, the
exercise of applying it to a particular issue, and the nature of contemporary
corporate law. My hope is that the remarks will in some small way do justice to
the rigor, verve, and passion Bill himself has brought to scholarly exchange for
more than forty years.
I. WHAT "SHAMING" MEANS AND How IT WORKS
"Shaming," according to two leading scholars, "is the process by which
citizens publicly and self-consciously draw attention to the bad dispositions or
actions of an offender, as a way of punishing him for having those dispositions
or engaging in those actions." 3 The enforcer expresses moral outrage at the
offender, expecting that the intended audience will respond with similar moral
disapproval.
Shaming works best in closely knit communities whose members hold
similar views about morality and appropriate social behavior. Japan is
frequently described as a country where shaming sanctions are widely and
effectively employed. The diversity of the United States, and our sharp political
polarization, makes the efficacy of shaming much less obvious in this country.
Yet Americans do hold widely shared views about many issues, such as outrage
at drunk driving. And nearly all of us participate in one or more communities
that could be described as closely knit. In our families or our profession, for
instance, relationships often are closely intertwined and our reputations matter
2. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 1811 (2001).
3. Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White Collar Criminals: A Proposalfor Reform of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 368 (1999).
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a great deal. In these contexts, shaming can be a powerful corrective when
individuals violate the shared values of the community.
In recent years, shaming has drawn a great deal of attention as an
alternative sanction in the criminal law, due in part to the creativity of a few
state law judges. Because shaming sanctions-such as requiring a drug
offender to hold a sign announcing that she was caught with cocaine or
requiring a drunk driver to affix a "DUI: Offender" bumper sticker to his car-
undermine the offender's reputation, enthusiasts argue, they can further each of
the traditional functions of criminal law.4 The threat of being shamed will deter
would-be offenders, and the reputational penalties suffered by actual offenders,
as a result of their shaming, will satisfy the retributive goals of the criminal
law. In short, shaming can both deter and punish, and it does so in a way that
expresses clear social condemnation of the offender's actions.
5
The enthusiasm is hardly unanimous, however. Shaming critics view it as a
scattershot sanction that has wildly different effects on different offenders,
seriously punishing some while glancing off those who are less susceptible to
discipline. They also worry that harnessing community enforcement really may
not be such a good thing. "Once the state stirs up public opprobrium against an
offender," as James Whitman puts it, "it cannot really control the way the
public treats that offender." 6 If shaming sanctions are too easy to apply, they
also may be used indiscriminately. This ease of access is particularly
worrisome given that offenders may have little opportunity to defend
themselves.
7
Corporations regularly figure in the shaming debates, in part because
several courts have required corporate polluters to issue public apologies for
their misbehavior. But private parties also enforce corporate shaming sanctions.
CalPERS engages in shaming when it announces a "focus list" of companies
with poor corporate governance, as did Bob Monks when he ran an
advertisement with silhouettes of the directors of Sears during a campaign to
persuade Sears to divest its financial services businesses.
8
In the discussion that follows, I briefly consider four different examples of
shaming or shaming-like behavior in corporate law. These illustrations suggest
both the promise and the perils of shaming sanctions and force us to consider
the kinds of tradeoffs that Professor Klein attempts to formalize in his criteria
4. The examples in this sentence are cited and described in Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming
Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 734-35 (1998).
5. Id. at 740-49.
6. James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1088
(1998).
7. See, e.g., Tony M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880 (1991). In Kleinian terms, critics of shaming are particularly worried about fairness (Criterion I)
and power (III) issues, whereas its defenders have tended to emphasize efficiency (II).
8. Both of these examples are discussed in more detail in Part IV, infra.
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for good laws.
II. THE "TONE AT THE Top" AND SHAMING WITHIN THE FIRM
Three years after the corporate scandals first broke, regulators and scholars
continue to debate the issue of how best to address the flaws in American
corporate governance. In a remarkable recent speech, Stephen Cutler, who was
Director of Enforcement at the SEC at the time, pointed to "the tone at the top"
as a particular concern.9 "An awful lot of people seem to be paying an awful lot
of attention to 'tone at the top,"' Cutler noted. "Articles are being written about
it. Speeches (in addition to this one) are being given about it."
After reciting a long list of companies the SEC had recently pursued, Cutler
drew two connections to his "tone at the top" theme. The first was simply that
the CEOs in many of the companies were "breaking the law," which suggested
that "they couldn't have been setting a particularly melodious tone".'' ° But the
misbehavior was not limited to the CEOs themselves. "Violations of the
securities laws," according to Cutler, "are very frequently the product of both
individual failings and a deficient corporate culture." The "tone at the top"
contributed to this pernicious culture, and a different tone might have
encouraged a healthier culture.
Shaming first entered Cutler's portrait as a small, implicit part of the role
Cutler sets out for the SEC in prodding corporate leaders to attend to the
institutional culture in their firms. "We're trying," he said, "to get the
fundamentally honest, decent CEO or CFO or General Counsel-the one who
wouldn't break the law-to say to herself when she wakes up in the morning:
'I'm going to spend part of my day worrying about, and doing something
about, the culture of my company."'' The SEC's principal tool in this quest is
imposing stiff fines and seeking other formal sanctions when corporations and
their executives violate the securities laws. But these traditional sanctions are
supplemented by shaming, as is evident by the speeches Cutler gave throughout
the country. In each of the speeches, including this one, he named names,
holding up wayward executives and companies for informal condemnation.
Far more striking, however, is Cutler's suggestion that the companies
themselves should engage in internal shaming. After underscoring that "the
managers themselves have to comply with the letter and the spirit of the rules,"
and exhorting managers to "make character a part of the firm's set of key hiring
criteria," Cutler encouraged them to use shaming-like strategies when
9. Stephen M. Cutler, Tone at the Top: Getting It Right, Speech at 2d Annual Corporate Counsel
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employees behave in an unethical fashion.1 2 The company "should take
appropriate action against the employee-swiftly and firmly.... And as much
as possible (and consistent with privacy concerns), the punishment and the
reason for it should be clear to the company's other employees."
Here is the vision: the managers should serve as enforcers, punishing
offenders and making the punishment public enough to serve as a warning to
other employees within the company. In theory, this could be done without
disclosing the name of the offender. But the offender's identity will often be
known-particularly if she is a high-level officer-and the offenders will be
shamed within the internal community.
The prospect of intra-company shaming raises two questions: will it work,
and is it fair to the employee who is sanctioned? Start with fairness. Holding an
employee up to criticism to "convey to [the company's] other employees in a
clear and forceful way that such conduct [is] unacceptable" seems to treat the
employee as a means rather than an end, subordinating her interests, and
invading her privacy in order to shape the company's corporate culture. If we
can be sure that employees will only be singled out in this fashion if they have
in fact violated a rule, and the company has adequate process protections in
place, the force of the objection weakens. But it does not dissolve altogether.
The risk that an employee's sense of shame will be manipulated to achieve the
goals of the company remains. This is one context where fairness concerns
should take precedence over the potential efficacy of the sanctions, particularly
if the punishment comes at a time when the company itself is being criticized.
13
It is interesting to note that employment law protections are designed to take
just these kinds of concerns into account.
In addition to these fairness concerns, there also are questions as to the
efficacy of internal shaming. If other employees view the implicit or explicit
naming of names as overbearing, for instance, the sanction could backfire,
prompting a backlash against the managers who imposed it. It also would be a
mistake to assume that internal shaming can be used to transform a
corporation's internal culture. Shaming does not create, or recreate, a
company's values; it reflects them. If the managers who set the tone are
themselves ethically challenged, they probably will not be actively policing
employees who play fast and loose with accounting or securities rules. For
similar reasons, shaming strategies will not by themselves counteract the ethos
of a bubble market. If the relevant enforcement communities-other employees
at the firm, the firm's shareholders, and investors generally-are themselves
12. Id.
13. If the company itself is being criticized, there is an increased risk that an employee may be
singled out as a scapegoat. Still another concern with internal shaming sanctions is that they make us
"accountable to strangers, those who don't know us whole, and may judge us out of context." See
Jeffrey Rosen, Comments at Anita Allen Book Symposium (Dec. 1, 2004).
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caught up in the gold rush, the shaming mechanism may simply break down.
When Fortune reporter Bethany McLean tried to persuade Fortune to run her
expose of Enron, to give a related example, she encountered repeated
resistance, and the story itself had little impact when it was first published.
III. THE WALL STREET PERP WALK
Long before he became the face of New York's post-9/11 resolve, Rudy
Giuliani perfected the perp walk during his tenure as U.S. Attorney for New
York.14 When the time came to arrest the prominent Wall Street traders and
bankers his office was accusing of insider trading and other violations, Giuliani
turned the arrests into a public spectacle. Handcuffs were slapped on in front of
television cameras, and footage of the defendants being paraded out of their
homes or offices featured prominently on the evening news. The perp walks
were a brilliant public relations move. They not only shamed the defendants;
15
they also sent a signal to other Wall Street traders, and, of course, helped to
help raise Giuliani's own profile.
Are perp walks an appropriate governance device? One obvious concern is
the absence of process. At least at first glance, perp walks seem to punish the
defendants before they have had the chance to fully respond to the allegations.
Information asymmetries, such as the absence of any way for ordinary citizens
to know whether the charges are warranted, increase the danger that a
defendant may be unfairly singled out for shaming.16 In theory, Giuliani and
other prosecutors were themselves taking a risk when they raised the public
profile of the arrests, which might seem to reduce the likelihood of
prosecutorial misbehavior. If the defendants in a perp walk case are later
exonerated, the U.S. attorney will have egg on his face. 17 But in practice, this
risk was quite limited. Many of the relevant federal crimes-such as mail and
wire fraud, perjury, and obstruction-are defined so broadly that prosecutors
can almost always obtain some kind of conviction. The breadth of the federal
criminal code gives prosecutors an enormous margin for error.
One obvious response to this mismatch between the positions of the
enforcers and of the offenders would be to curtail the scope of the federal
criminal law, so that the crimes charged bear a closer resemblance to what the
14. For a critical discussion of Giuliani's strategies for prosecuting white collar Wall Street
defendants, in a chapter entitled "Rudy Giuliani's Reign of Terror," see DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK:
THE CONSPIRACY To DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND His FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 98-127 (1995).
15. At least in a general sense. In their narrowest conception, shaming sanctions assume that the
offender will be ashamed of their behavior. Some of Giuliani's defendants may not have been. I am
using shaming in a broader sense, without limiting it to contexts where the offender internalizes the
sanction.
16. In more explicit Kleinian terms, serious fairness (Criterion I) and power concerns (III) must be
weighed against potential efficiency benefits (II) such as deterrence.
17. As it turned out, one of Giuliani's defendants did indeed get off. But most did not.
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defenders are actually being accused of doing. 18 But a much smaller and more
realistic response might also help: why not take the pretrial-media maneuvers
into account when defendants ask for a change in venue? Because high-profile
cases are central to a federal prosecutors' reputation, the risk of losing control
of the case would serve as a partial check on prosecutors' pretrial behavior.
IV. SHAMING BY SHAREHOLDERS: CALPERS AND INDIVIDUAL ACTIVISTS
The most pervasive enforcers of shaming sanctions in American corporate
governance have been corporate shareholders. In 1992, frustrated by the Sears
directors' complacency as the company's stock price wallowed, shareholder
activist Robert Monks purchased a full-page ad in the Wall Street Journal that
consisted of silhouettes of the nine Sears directors, together with a caption
listing the name and position of each. The headline of the ad, in huge bold
print, described the directors as "Non-Performing Assets." Monks and his
frequent ally Nell Minow are convinced that the ad induced the directors to
make several of the changes he had been advocating for months. CalPERS,
California's public pension, uses an analogous strategy. Each year, CalPERS
shines the spotlight on a small group of companies by releasing a "focus list" of
companies with poor corporate governance. Quite frequently, this attention
spurs the companies to make immediate changes such as separating the CEO
and board chair positions or adding independent directors. 
19
Although shaming is often touted as a low cost alternative to traditional
sanctions in the criminal law context, cost is a serious obstacle for private-
shareholder activists like Monks and Minow. A full-page ad in the Wall Street
Journal costs well over $100,000, which discourages frivolous shaming
campaigns but also chills the use of the shaming strategy to prompt genuinely
beneficial changes. This is unfortunate. Corporate directors are in many
respects an ideal target for shaming sanctions, since they are, in Minow's
words, "the most reputationally sensitive people in the world. ' 20 How might we
encourage good shaming without also opening the floodgates to its more
pernicious twin? Here is one possible answer: if a shareholder activist wages a
proxy campaign that garners significant support-say, at least 35% of the
shareholder vote-the company should be required to, subsidize any shaming
efforts undertaken as part of the campaign. The "significant support"
18. For a more nuanced and somewhat different view of the related issue of pretextual
prosecutions, see Darryl C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583 (2005). Note that even a
narrower criminal code wouldn't completely solve the problem, since it wouldn't address the use of perp
walks by prosecutors who mistakenly believed that conviction was likely.
19. The Monks and CalPERS's illustrations are described in detail (together with a reprinting of
Monks' ad) in Skeel, supra note 2, at 1836-41 (CalPERS), 1844-50 (Sears ad).
20. Skeel, supra note 2, at 1812.
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threshhold is a rough but useful gauge of the importance of the governance
issues raised by the shareholder's campaign.
21
With shaming by CalPERS and other public pension funds, the shaming
calculus is quite different. CalPERS does not face the kinds of cost constraints
that limit shaming by private shareholders. With CalPERS, the most serious
problem is political. Because CalPERS officials are politically appointed, there
is an ever-present danger that its investing decisions will be shaped as much by
politics as by economics. The recent ouster of CalPERS's head is an all too
vivid reminder of this danger. A second concern is CalPERS's tendency to rely
on broad governance yardsticks of somewhat questionable significance when it
chooses its focus list. On the positive side of the ledger, CalPERS and other
public pensions have often taken the lead in identifying companies whose poor
governance interferes with their performance. Overall, shaming by CalPERS
and other public pensions seems to enhance corporate governance, but this is
less uncomplicatedly the case than with private shareholders who have their
own money on the line.
V. SHAMING SENTENCES AND PENALTIES FOR CORPORATE OFFENDERS
The final illustration returns us to the public enforcement context that has
drawn the most attention from criminal law scholars. Just as judges have
devised creative shaming sanctions for drunk drivers and drug users, courts
have sometimes required corporate defendants to proclaim their offense to the
world. Companies that have violated the environmental laws, for instance, may
be instructed to publish an apology for their misbehavior in a local newspaper.
Corporate apologies, or corporate shaming, offer several of the classic
benefits of shaming sanctions. Requiring the company to issue an apology is a
low-cost sanction for the government, since the offending company foots the
bill, and the public statement expresses condemnation for the misbehavior in a
way that fines alone do not. The most important question is efficacy, whether
the sanction will have any effect on the company's internal culture and its
managers' behavior.
Even if the answer is uncertain---either because the prosecution itself has
already shamed the company, or because the company's managers and
employees do not take the message to heart-shaming is ideally suited to many
kinds of violations. The fit is particularly apt for regulatory violations for which
the company can appropriately be blamed. Moreover, as with several of the
sanctions discussed already, there are several simple ways that courts could add
to the bite of the sanctions. At least for criminal law violations, courts could
21. This approach is borrowed from a proposal advocated by Lucian Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan.
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analysing Legal Policy Towards Proxy
Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1071, 1085 (1990).
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require key managers to appear in person at the sentencing. 22 In addition, if the
company is instructed to issue a public apology, the statement could include the
names of the company's principal managers and perhaps even employees who
were directly involved in the misbehavior. Shaming individuals, rather than just
the corporation, reintroduces dignity concerns. But if the conduct is genuinely
blameworthy-and it involves regulatory violations such as price fixing or
polluting rather than highly charged issues like sex or race discrimination-it is
appropriate to name names.
23
The most serious downside of court-imposed shaming sanctions is the risk
that idiosyncratic judges will impose outrageous sanctions. Unlike private
shareholders, judges do not bear the costs of their sanctions, so the principal
checks on their creativity are conscience and good judgment, together with the
company's right to appeal the appropriateness of the sanction. Adding a
template-a basic, suggested form of corporate apology-to the sentencing
guidelines might help to further reign in inappropriate judicial creativity.
In short, corporate shaming sanctions are not appropriate for every
violation, and there is a danger that the sanctions may sometimes say as much
about the judge as about the offender. But these concerns are limited enough,
and the benefits great enough, to justify continued, even increased use of this
strategy.
CONCLUSION
More than with almost any corporate law issue I can think of, shaming
sanctions directly implicate each of the four sets of issues in the Klein
typology: fairness, efficiency, administrative costs, and choice of decision
maker. This brief essay has argued for an approach that attempts to seriously
engage each of the criteria-though I suspect in a less systematic fashion than
Professor Klein would advocate.
Thinking back over the exercise of applying the Kleinian typology to a
corporate law issue, I am struck even more by how prominent a role the
typology gives to issues of fairness, power, and legitimacy. Corporate shaming
raises these concerns, but it seems quite unusual in this respect. Almost
everywhere else in corporate law, questions of legitimacy lay far in the
background. They are subsumed into other inquiries or ignored altogether. The
literature seems to have other fish to fry.
Why is this? Two reasons stand out. One is simply that, to borrow Bill
Bratton's felicitous phrase, "corporate law makes us all welfare
22. This is a major theme of Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72
S. CAL. L. REv. 959 (1999).
23. In Kleinian terms, the retributive and efficiency benefits of the shaming outweigh fairness
concerns, except with explosive issues like discrimination.
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consequentialists." 24 Corporate law scholars hold very different views as to the
appropriate balance of power among managers, directors, and shareholders, and
more generally, about the proper role for legal regulation. But nearly everyone
assumes that the goal is to shape the parties' behavior, and to counteract
problems such as the agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership
and control, in order to promote more efficient production of goods and
services.
The second reason is that the scope of corporate law has dramatically
narrowed over the course of the past hundred years.25 Until the early twentieth
century, debates over the corporation included worries about monopoly and the
relationship between management and labor-not just internal governance
issues such shareholder voting rules and the duties of corporate directors. Over
the course of the twentieth century, many of these issues were hived off from
corporate law. The most obvious historical reason for this was that charter
competition discouraged the states, who had always been the principal
regulator of internal corporate governance, from engaging in aggressive
regulation. 6 Over time, most dramatically during the New Deal, Congress and
federal regulators stepped in and established separate regulatory frameworks
for labor law, antitrust, and environmental law. As a result, the domain of
corporate law steadily shrank. Now it includes only internal corporate
governance, together with the disclosure and antifraud provisions in the federal
securities laws.
If we widen our lens to consider labor, antitrust, and environmental law,
among others, as part of the overall regulation of business enterprise,
legitimacy, and power issues figure much more prominently. It is not accidental
that in several of the instances where corporate shaming raises serious power or
fairness concerns, the most obvious correctives come from areas other than
corporate law.
27
Notice how the Kleinian typology prods us to consider how all of these
pieces fit together. Taking the typology seriously suggests the need for a
broader conception of corporate law, one that is at the least aware of the other
pieces that comprise our overall regulation of corporate enterprise. A more
capacious perspective may not immediately change the conclusions we reach
24. William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY Bus.
L.J. 59, 61 (2005).
25. This is a central theme of Ed Kitch's contribution. Ed Kitch, The Simplification of the Criteria
for Good Corporate Law or Why Corporate Law Isn 't As Important Anymore, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 35
(2005).
26. For an excellent discussion of this dynamic, see Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Business
Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State, 30 POL. & SOC.
277 (2002).
27. See, e.g., supra Part I (employment law as check on internal shaming); Part 11 (possible
responses to concerns of"perp walks").
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about internal governance issues. But it might, .and it certainly will influence
the questions that corporate law scholars ask. And questions, as Bill Klein has
long understood, are how the scholarly enterprise moves forward.
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